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Abstract 
We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel 
enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we 
present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission 
(EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, cartel 
market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, types of 
infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as cartel duration. In a second step, we 
complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel 
enforcement process in the European Union – subdivided further into its duration, types of 
cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and 
the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ).  
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 “Fighting cartels is one of the most important areas of activity of any 
competition authority and a clear priority of the Commission. Cartels are 
cancers on the open market economy, which forms the very basis of our 
Community. By destroying competition, they cause serious harm to our 
economies and consumers. In the long run cartels also undermine the 
competitiveness of the industry involved, because they eliminate the 
pressure from competition to innovate and achieve cost efficiencies.” 
Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition (1999-2004)1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Among the few things most economists would likely agree on is the social harmfulness of 
cartels. Defined as ”… group of firms who have agreed explicitly among themselves to 
coordinate their activities in order to raise market price …”2, a perfectly functioning cartel – 
involving all firms in the market and referring to substitute products – is expected to not only 
cause static losses in consumer and overall welfare due to elevated monopoly prices but is 
also likely to generate dynamic inefficiencies in the form of, e.g., reduced incentives for 
product or process innovations … or as Sir John Hicks once put it: “The best of all monopoly 
profits is a quiet life”3. 
 As cartels – in contrast to mergers – usually do not create any kind of benefits to society 
which could be traded-off against the anticompetitive effects, they are a prime example for a 
per se prohibition reflected in many antitrust legislations around the world – and with the 
European Union (EU) being no exception. At the latest since the tenure of Mario Monti from 
1999 to 2004, all European Commissioners for Competition have clearly committed to the 
fight against cartels as top priority in European competition policy. While Neelie Kroes 
(2004-2010) reiterated that one of her key objectives was not only to “… merely destabilize 
cartels. I want to tear the ground from under them” 4, her successor, Joaquin Almunia (2010-
2014), reinforced the adamant stance: “The Commission will continue its relentless fight 
against cartels” 5.   
 Consistent with these clear general statements of former Commissioners on the importance 
of the fight against cartels, the European Commission (EC) was very active in both refining 
                                                     
1  Speech on “Fighting Cartels Why and How? Why Should we be Concerned with Cartels and Collusive 
Behaviour?” at the 3rd Nordic Competition Policy Conference, Stockholm, 11 September 2000, 
SPEECH/00/295. 
2  Pepall et al. (1999), p. 345.  
3  Hicks (1935), p. 8.  
4  Speech on “Tackling Cartels – A Never-Ending Task” at an Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Criminal and 
Administrative Policy Panel Session, Brasilia, 8 October 2009, SPEECH/09/454. 
5  Speech on “First Cartel Decision under Settlement Procedure – Introductory Remarks” at the European 
Commission, Brussels, 19 May 2010, SPEECH/10/247.  
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and extending EU cartel policy tools. In particular, since the beginning of the new century, the 
Commission implemented two revisions of the leniency program, completed a major reform 
of the fine guidelines, introduced a settlement procedure, intensified cooperation between 
competition authorities in the fight against particularly international cartels and – finally yet 
importantly – promoted the private enforcement of anti-cartel laws.  
 From an academic perspective, the identified policy changes together with the availability 
of detailed cartel- or even firm-specific data – published by the Commission, the General 
Court and the European Court of Justice as part of their respective decisions or judgments – 
provide an ideal environment for conducting quantitative research. However, while both a 
significant number of specific econometric studies6 – e.g., evaluating the Commission’s 
leniency policy or investigating the determinants of cartel duration – as well as more survey-
type assessments7 exist, a comprehensive quantitative assessment of both detected cartels as 
well as the cartel enforcement process in light of the recent policy changes is currently 
missing. Although such studies admittedly face the usual disadvantages attached to the use of 
descriptive empirical analysis, they have the key advantage of being able to provide a full 
picture on cartel cases and the enforcement process thus promising to generate substantial 
value for both academic and practical purposes.    
 In this context, we provide such a comprehensive quantitative assessment of detected and 
decided cartels and the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union from 2001 
to 2015 – with the remainder of the paper being structured as follows. Section 2 provides a 
general initial characterization of cartels and cartel enforcement in the European Union. In 
parallel to a description of the entire cartel enforcement process, the section also introduces 
into the major changes in EU cartel rules and policies. Furthermore, a description of our 
database on EU cartel cases is provided.  
 Section 3 then continues with a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the 
European Commission between 2001 and 2015 with respect to various criteria such as the 
number of involved firm groups, cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved 
                                                     
6  Aiming at increasing the readability of the paper, we refrain from providing reviews of the rather large 
theoretical and empirical literature on cartels and cartel policies in various jurisdictions (see, e.g., Carree et 
al. (2010) or Hüschelrath and Weigand (2013) for detailed assessments).  
7  To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive quantitative assessment of EU cartels and the cartel 
enforcement process does not exist. Harrington (2006) also makes use of the detailed cartel case information 
provided by the Commission to study how competitors manage to implement and stabilize cartel agreements. 
Veljanovski (2007, 2011) and Wils (2002) provide detailed assessments of particularly the fining policy of 
the European Commission in light of the introduction of the 1998 fine guidelines. Finally yet importantly, 
Carree et al. (2010) and Russo et al. (2010) provide detailed assessments of European Commission decisions 
on competition including cartel agreements. However, both studies do not provide a complete quantitative 
assessment of EU cartel cases and the cartel enforcement process and make use of a data set that ends in 2004 
(thus preventing an investigation of the effects of the EU cartel policy changes in the new century). 
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industries, affected countries, types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as 
cartel duration. In Section 4, we complement this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative 
assessment of the cartel enforcement process in the European Union, subdivided further into 
its duration, types of cartel detection, fines levels, the leniency program, the settlement 
procedure and the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). Section 5 closes the paper with a discussion of its main insights and an 
identification of avenues for future research.    
2 Cartels and cartel enforcement in the European Union: An initial characterization 
In this section, we provide an initial high-level characterization of public cartel enforcement8 
in the European Union. In parallel to the description of the entire enforcement process in the 
subsequent subsection, we briefly introduce the four major changes in EU cartel rules and 
policies in our observation period from 2001 to 2015: (1 and 2) the revisions of the leniency 
program in 2002 and 2006 (originally introduced in 1996), (3) the revision of the fine 
guidelines in 2006 (originally introduced in 1998), and (4) the introduction of the settlement 
procedure in 2008. The section is closed by a description of our database of EU cartel cases – 
which provides the basis for our quantitative assessment of EU cartel cases and EU cartel 
enforcement in Sections 3 and 4.  
2.1 The cartel enforcement process in the European Union 
Article 101 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits 
agreements between companies which prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU and 
which may affect trade between Member States. Although the prohibition generally applies to 
both (anti-competitive) horizontal and vertical agreements, in the following, we will focus on 
a brief characterization of the EU enforcement process for horizontal ‘hard-core’ cartel 
agreements, which can broadly be subdivided further into (1) the investigation and decision 
by the European Commission and (2) the (optional) initiation of an appeal against the 
respective EC cartel decision by one or more of the convicted cartel members.9  
 
                                                     
8  In this paper, we concentrate on the public enforcement of anti-cartel laws in the European Union. See, e.g., 
Hüschelrath and Peyer (2013) for a law and economics perspective on the private enforcement of anti-cartel 
laws and its interaction with public enforcement. 
9  The description of the EU cartel enforcement process largely follows European Commission (2013), 
Competition: Antitrust Procedures in Anticompetitive Agreements, Brussels, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/publications/factsheets/antitrust_procedures_101_en.pdf (last accessed on 10 August 2016) and 
additional sources mentioned in Hellwig et al. (2016). 
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Investigation and decision by the European Commission  
In general, the cartel enforcement process within the EC can be subdivided further into six 
subsequent stages: (1) initial information gathering, (2) preliminary investigations, (3) case 
proceedings, (4) statement of objections, (5) oral hearings and (6) decision. As cartel 
members are typically aware of the fact that their agreements are illegal, they keep them in 
secrecy and initial information gathering therefore becomes the most crucial step in the 
enforcement activities of the EC. While a complaint by a competitor, a customer, another 
agency or a (former) employee used to be the dominant way to initiate cartel investigations, 
the importance of the leniency program as case generator began to rise with its introduction in 
1996 and two subsequent reforms of the program in 2002 and 2006. Generally, a leniency 
program (LP) offers law infringers either a fine reduction of even full amnesty if they disclose 
an infringement to the responsible authority and (fully) cooperate with it during the 
investigation. 
 Subsequent to the initial gathering of information on an alleged cartel infringement, the EC 
can decide to open preliminary proceedings as part of which it can use certain investigative 
powers such as, e.g., dawn raids or other information requests to be able to assess whether the 
rules laid down in Article 101 TFEU have been breached. At the end of the preliminary 
proceedings, the EC has to make a decision whether the collected material appears sufficient 
to initiate case proceedings – and therefore an in-depth investigation – or alternatively to close 
the investigation.  
 In case an in-depth investigation is commenced and results in the confirmation of the EC’s 
initial concerns, the EC furnishes a statement of objections (SO) in which it – based on the 
collected pieces of evidence – informs the respective firms in writing of the objections raised 
against them. After the submission of the SO to the accused firms, they have certain rights to 
defense such as ‘access to file’, i.e., they are allowed to see all non-confidential pieces of 
evidence collected by the EC during its investigation. Subsequently, the parties have the right 
to reply to the SO in writing and to request an oral hearing with an independent hearing 
officer. Interestingly, since the introduction of the settlement procedure in 2008, the 
Commission has the possibility to bypass these time-consuming procedural steps by offering a 
settlement to the involved parties. In exchange for their admittance of liability, the 
Commission grants a fine reduction of 10 percent and is expected to reach a significant 
reduction in the duration of the respective proceedings.    
 In non-settled cases – after reconsidering its own analysis and results in light of the 
feedback of the accused firms – the EC may decide to abandon (part of) its initial objections 
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(or even to close the case). If the EC’s concerns are not fully dispelled, it drafts a decision 
prohibiting the respective infringement. The draft decision is then submitted to the Advisory 
Committee (composed of representatives of the Member States’ competition authorities) for a 
final check. If fines are proposed in the draft decision – as usually the case in cartel 
investigations – the Committee meets a second time to specifically discuss them before the 
draft decision is submitted to the College of Commissioners which adopts the decision.  
 The fine level imposed by the European Commission on the respective cartel members is 
the key output of the entire cartel investigation and decision process. By imposing fines, the 
European Commission pursues two interrelated goals: punishing detected breaches of 
competition law and deterring future infringements. Aiming at implementing both goals in a 
transparent and effective fashion, the EC introduced first ‘Guidelines on the method of setting 
fines’ in 1998 that were revised substantially in 2006.  
The appeals process against decisions by the European Commission  
As any decision by either a court or a public authority is made under uncertainty, it is 
considered a constitutional right of the losing party to seek a reconsideration of their 
arguments as part of an appeals (or judicial review) process. Under EU competition law in 
general, and for EC cartel cases in particular, the appellate court proceedings can be either 
one- or two-stage. At the first stage, a cartel member that has serious concerns with a (fining) 
decision of the EC can file an appeal with the General Court (GC) of the European Union. 
Generally, the GC not only has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by 
the EC, it also has full jurisdiction to review the entire Commission decision (including a 
repetition of the full assessment process).  
 At the second stage of the appeals process in EC cartel cases, judgments of the GC can be 
appealed before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the unsuccessful party, i.e., either the 
convicted firm, the EC itself or both. The ECJ is the highest European appellate court and has 
the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by the GC. However, in its 
proceedings, it limits itself to questions of law and has no jurisdiction to (re-)review the facts 
and analyze the evidence that the GC used to support its findings and decision. 
2.2 Description of the database of EU cartel cases from 2001 to 2015 
Before we commence with our quantitative assessment of cartel cases and the cartel 
enforcement process in the European Union between 2001 and 2015, is it is important to 
briefly describe the construction of our database. Back in 2011, ZEW started to construct a 
detailed database of all cartel cases decided by the European Commission since the year 2001. 
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The database was extended further and further and currently contains detailed information on 
all cartel indictment and appeals cases decided by the EC, the GC and the ECJ between 2001 
and 2015. The data were collected from decisions and press releases published by the EC in 
the course of its investigations as well as from judgment documents provided by the online 
platform CVRIA.  
 In particular, the database combines cartel-related, firm group-related and firm-related 
information. At the cartel level, information such as the cartel type, cartel duration, number of 
cartel members, involved industry, relevant geographic market(s) and imposed overall fines 
are available. With a view to firm- and group-specific data, the database contains information 
on the individual length of cartel participation, the fine amounts imposed by the EC, whether 
the firm applied for leniency or appealed the EC decision and the value of fine reductions 
following a successful leniency application or appeal. Furthermore, specific factors that are 
relevant for the calculation of the fine, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances or 
repeat offenders, have been documented as well. 
 Although we believe to have created a uniquely rich database on European cartels, it is 
important to close with an important disclaimer when it comes to an interpretation of various 
breakdowns of the data presented in the following sections. By definition, our entire 
quantitative assessment is based on the population of detected cartels whose cases were 
decided by the European Commission between 2001 and 2015 (excluding three readopted 
cases10). Although recent research by Harrington and Wei (2016) suggests that such a sample 
of detected cartels may tell us something about the latent universe of cartels, the fact that our 
quantitative analysis can only rely on the population of detected and decided cartels is 
certainly important to have in mind – particularly in attempts to provide a broader discussion 
of the implications of some of our main findings. 
3 Characterization of EU Cartel Cases decided between 2001 and 2015 
In this section, we present a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the 
European Commission between 2001 and 2015. In particular, we subdivide our descriptive 
quantitative assessment into the following seven distinct topics: (1) number of cases, cartels 
and involved firm groups, (2) cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, (3) 
involved industries, (4) affected countries, (5) types of infringement, (6) types of cartel 
breakdown as well as (7) cartel duration. In the corresponding seven subsections, we 
commence by providing the respective absolute numbers for both the entire observation 
                                                     
10  The cases are Gas Insulated Switchgear (Case COMP/39.966), Steel Beams (Case COMP/38.907) and 
Manufacture of other Organic Basic Chemicals (Case COMP/39.003). 
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period – i.e., 2001 to 2015 – and three subperiods with a length of five years each – i.e., 2001 
to 2005, 2006 to 2010, and 2011 to 2015 – followed by a more detailed assessment of selected 
developments over time by mostly comparing relative figures on a yearly basis.  
3.1 Number of cases, cartels and involved firm groups 
A natural starting point for a characterization of detected EU cartels is a detailed discussion of 
the number of cases, cartels and involved firm groups. While the number of decided cases 
essentially is a measure of the yearly enforcement activity of the European Commission – to 
the degree that this is reflected in the closing of a case with a certain case number – the 
number of cartels diverges as soon as the Commission decides to investigate separate (but still 
related) cartels under a single case number.11 
 In contrast to the number of cases and cartels as key enforcement variables, the number of 
involved firm groups12 is an important internal characteristic of the detected cartels. Ceteris 
paribus, it can be expected that reaching and sustaining a cartel agreement becomes more and 
more complicated with an increasing number of firms – basically because they are likely to all 
have diverging plans and interests on an appropriate design and implementation of the cartel 
agreement.  
 Based on this categorization, an initial summary of our data reveals that over the entire 
observation period from 2001 to 2015, in sum 90 cases were decided by the European 
Commission, consisting of 113 cartels and 600 involved firm groups. The distribution of these 
values over the respective years is shown in the two charts in Figure 1.   
  
Figure 1: Number of cases, cartels and involved firm groups 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
                                                     
11  In order to account for this disparity, we speak of ‘decided cases’ when referring to the European 
Commission’s decisions and of ‘cartel cases’ when referring to the underlying cartels. 
12  Groups of firms were formed according to the respective EC decisions, i.e., firms within a group are linked 
through ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines.  
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Starting a discussion of Figure 1 with the number of decided cases plotted in the left-hand 
chart, it is shown that – in our observation period from 2001 to 2015 – between 4 and 10 cases 
were decided by the European Commission per year, leading to a total average of almost 6 
cases per year. However, subdividing our observation period into three five-year subperiods 
reveals a certain downward trend in the number of cases from on average 6.6 cases in the 
2001-2005 period, via 6.4 cases in the 2006-2010 period to 5.0 cases in the final 2011-2015 
period. 
 Furthermore, although the number of cartels is – as expected – found to be related to the 
number of cases, both categories only show identical values in 6 out of the 15 years which 
define our observation period. While the total average is about 7.5 cartels per year, again 
applying the three five-year subperiods show an increase in the number of cartels from 7.2 
cases in the 2001-2005 period, via 7.8 cases in the 2006-2010 period to 7.6 cases in the most 
recent 2011-2015 period. In other words, the observed downward trend in the number of cases 
cannot be found when focusing on the number of cartels. Although admittedly speculative, 
changes in both the structure of cartels and/or the organization of work within the 
Commission might explain the recent increase in the bundling of several related cartels into a 
single case.   
 In addition to the number of cases and cartels, the right-hand chart in Figure 1 above shows 
the yearly developments of the number of involved firm groups. Interestingly, the respective 
yearly values are found to fluctuate quite substantially between the lowest value of 14 
involved firm groups in 2011 and the highest value of 67 involved firm groups in 2010. While 
the first period from 2001 to 2005 experienced an average number of involved firm groups of 
about 37, the value increased to about 49 in the 2006-2010 period; however, subsequently 
experiencing a drop to about 35 firm groups in the final period from 2011 to 2015.13  
 Complementary to information on the absolute numbers of the involved firm groups, the 
above mentioned expected relationship between the number of firms in an industry/cartel and 
the likelihood of cartelization suggests a brief assessment of the average number of involved 
firm groups per cartel. The respective values are presented in Figure 2. 
                                                     
13  However, the fact that the lowest and highest values appeared in subsequent years – but were allocated to 
different subperiods – suggests that the respective averages of these two subperiods are strongly biased 
making any additional interpretation of the values obsolete. For example, if the observation period is 
subdivided into two periods – 2001 to 2008 and 2009 to 2015, the respective average values for the number 
of involved firm groups are found to be almost identical at 40 firm groups in both subperiods.  
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Figure 2: Average number of involved firm groups 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 2, with the two exceptions of the years 2006 and 2010, the average 
number of involved firm groups fluctuates around an average of 5.6 firm groups per cartel 
over the entire observation period. However, while the first enforcement period from 2001 to 
2005 shows only limited variation around an average of 5.0 firm groups, the average of 7.0 
firm groups for the subsequent 2006 to 2010 period includes the two extreme values making a 
direct comparison less insightful.14 The last period from 2011 to 2015, however, is then 
characterized by a clear decrease in the average number of involved firm groups reflected in 
an average value of 4.7 firm groups.  
 Before we turn to a further characterization of the cartel cases decided by the European 
Commission between 2001 and 2015, it is important to introduce a general differentiation in 
the presentation of cartel statistics. So far, we have analyzed the respective cases, cartels and 
involved firm groups by using the year of decision by the European Commission as basis. 
Although such a breakdown of the data appears appropriate in a quantitative assessment of 
most cartel enforcement characteristics, two alternative bases may occasionally produce better 
interpretable (and more insightful) results: the year of cartel detection and the year of cartel 
cessation.  
 For example, if the aim is to assess different types of cartel breakdown (e.g., natural death 
or detected by the Commission while ongoing) – including the study of possible linkages 
between cartel breakdowns and cartel policy changes (such as, e.g., the introduction or reform 
                                                     
14  Please note that the two years with an unusually high average number of involved firm groups are followed 
by years with unusually low average numbers (i.e., 2007 and 2011) suggesting that the differences might 
simply be driven by ‘end of year’ effects. For example, whether a larger case is decided in December or 
January can have a substantial influence on overall yearly statistics (due to the generally rather low absolute 
numbers of cases, cartels, and involved firm groups).  
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of a leniency program) – an analysis based on the decision date may provide only limited 
(biased) insights; basically because the inceptions and durations of EC case investigations 
typically diverge quite substantially. Furthermore, although an analysis based on the year of 
detection is likely to provide more valuable information, a quantitative analysis based on the 
year of cartel cessation will generate further insights – especially in light of the fact that 
roughly half of the cartels in our database died of natural causes while the other half was 
detected by the European Commission at a later point in time.  
 Aiming at further substantiating our claim that the choice of the most suitable basis for the 
question at hand can be crucial, Figure 3 below shows the number of cartels for the three 
different bases just introduced: year of cartel cessation, year of detection and year of decision. 
  
Figure 3: Number of cartels by year of cartel cessation, detection and decision 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown by Figure 3, the three alternative bases of measuring the number of cartels reveal 
partly substantial differences. Attempting to disentangle the underlying drivers, it becomes 
obvious that – although Figure 3 still refers to all EU cartel cases decided between 2001 and 
2015 – the ‘year of cartel cessation’ basis demands an extension of the time scale down to the 
year 1995 – as the oldest 3 cartels that were decided in the 2001-2015 observation period 
ceased to exist already in 1995. At the other end of the observation period, Figure 3 further 
shows that 3 cartels that ended in 2012 were already decided by the European Commission 
until the end of 2015.  
 For the ‘year of detection’ basis, Figure 3 reveals that the first cartels decided on in our 
observation period from 2001 to 2015 were already detected in the mid to late 1990’s – e.g., 1 
cartel each in 1995 and 1996 and even 5 cartels in 1997 – reflecting the rather long duration 
of an investigation by the European Commission. Furthermore, Figure 3 also shows that the 
youngest cartel that was already decided on – until the end of the year 2015 – was detected in 
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2013. However, again taking the average duration of cartel case investigations into account, it 
is highly likely that further cartels that were detected, e.g., in 2013, will be decided by the 
European Commission in the years to come. As a consequence, especially the values on the 
right-hand side of Figure 3 are expected to change in case the observation period is extended 
beyond the year 2015.    
3.2 Cartel market shares and market share asymmetries 
While the previous section discussed the absolute and average numbers of firm groups 
involved in cartel agreements detected by the European Commission, we now turn to an 
assessment of the respective market shares of the cartels in general and market share 
asymmetries between cartel members in particular. Both characteristics have direct 
relationships to the theory of cartelization. First, the possibilities and incentives to form a 
cartel are expected to increase with the aggregated market share of the cartel – basically 
because it increases the significance and therefore the profits of the cartel. Vice versa, an 
increasing share of non-cartel members (‘cartel outsiders’) reduce the possibilities and 
incentives to form a cartel as the overall cartel profit’s pie – as well as the individual slices for 
the separate cartel members – are likely to shrink.  
 Second, in addition to the scope of the cartel agreement as such, the asymmetry of market 
shares between the cartel members is a further characteristic that may influence the likelihood 
of cartelization as well as the stability of such agreements. Ceteris paribus, it is reasonable to 
expect that it is easier to reach and maintain an agreement between four firms that all have 
identical market shares compared to more asymmetric situations in which, e.g., one firm has a 
substantially larger market share than the other cartel members.  
 Aiming at investigating both characteristics for the 113 cartel cases in our database, it is 
important to remark that the respective information is only available for smaller subsets of our 
database. While detailed information on combined market shares was available for in sum 51 
cartel cases, the sample was reduced further to in sum 40 cartels for which the market shares 
of all members were either directly reported in the Commission’s decision documents or 
calculated by using available case information.15 Figure 3 below shows the respective 
combined market shares of the cartel and all cartel outsiders (ordered by decision date). 
                                                     
15  It should be noted further that the cases for which the respective information was available are not equally 
distributed over time. The very large majority of included cases was decided in either the first (2001-2005) or 
the second (2006-2010) subperiod. 
12 
 
   
Figure 4: Market share of cartel and non-cartel members 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown by Figure 4, the combined market share of all cartel members in the respective 
cartels is rather high, reaching an average of 79 percent for all 51 cases for which the 
respective information was available. However, in only 3 cases, the cartel was complete in the 
sense that it included all firms operating in the respective market – suggesting that the large 
majority of cartels have to somehow cope with the presence of (a) cartel outsider(s). 
Furthermore, in 3 different cartels16, the combined market shares of all members were rather 
low reaching values below 50 percent. However, in all these cases, certain specificities of the 
industry and cartel led to successful cartelization despite rather low combined market shares.  
 Turning from an assessment of combined market shares to the more specific question of 
the degree of asymmetry in the market shares of the respective cartel members, (at least) two 
separate measures can be differentiated. First, the respective market shares of the cartel 
members (in percentage values) can simply be plotted allowing the identification of different 
degrees of market share asymmetry. Second, a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the 
market shares of all cartel members can be calculated. As the HHI, by definition, takes both 
the sizes of the individual market shares as well as the distribution of the different individual 
market shares into account, such a cartel-related HHI17 can be seen as a useful additional 
                                                     
16  The respective three (specific) cases are Fine Art Auction Houses (Case COMP/37.784), Bananas (Case 
COMP/39.188) and Airfreight (Case COMP/39.258).   
17  The cartel-related HHI is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all cartel members, i.e., the rest 
of the market in the form of potential cartel outsiders is ignored. By construction, the HHI not only rises with 
a general increase in concentration but also with an increasing asymmetry of the market shares. For example, 
if a cartel consists of four members having a market share of 20 percent each, the respective cartel-related 
HHI can be derived as follows: (0.2)2+(0.2)2+(0.2)2+(0.2)2*10,000=1,600. However, assuming a more 
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measure. In Figure 5 below, we combine both measures to facilitate an easier comparison and 
interpretation.  
  
Figure 5: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and market share distribution of firm groups 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Starting with an interpretation of the HHI values plotted in Figure 5, it is revealed that – 
although the majority of cartels reach values above 1,800 – thus suggesting an at least 
moderately concentrated market – the variation between the different cartels is rather large. 
While the average HHI value for all cartel cases shown in Figure 5 is found to be 2,114, the 
spectrum of HHI values reaches from 153 in the Airfreight case (Case COMP/39.258) – 
characterized by cartel members with exclusively small market shares – to 4,942 in the Raw 
Tobacco Spain case (Case COMP/38.238) – characterized by one dominant cartel member 
with a market share of 67 percent, two further cartel members with a market share of 15 
percent and a fourth member with a share of 1.6 percent.  
 Additionally, the individual market shares of the involved firm groups – represented by the 
respective black rhombuses on the respective HHI bars – reveal that cases with a low cartel 
HHI are indeed characterized by a few rather small cartel members who were – due to the 
above mentioned industry- and cartel-specifics – still able to successfully form a functioning 
cartel. For example, in the Airfreight case, a group of larger airlines – mostly operating in 
passenger transportation but also using the belly of airplanes for freight transportation – 
coordinated on prices for airfreight (and partly also various surcharges). As the airfreight 
business also includes large specialized companies – who mostly did not participate in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
asymmetric allocation of cartel-related market shares, e.g., 40 percent, 20 percent, 10 percent and 10 percent 
would result in an cartel-related HHI of 2,200 (i.e., a higher concentrated and more asymmetric market). 
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cartel – and the respective market shares also vary substantially between the various global 
transportation routes, an untypically small combined market share or about 34 percent was 
identified by the Commission18 – leading to the unusually small cartel-related HHI value 
mentioned above.  
3.3 Involved industries 
A further variable of interest in the characterization of EU cartel cases relates to the involved 
industries. As the possibilities for successful cartelization are influenced by various 
characteristics of the respective industries – to mention the size of entry barriers, the 
frequency of interaction, the degree of market transparency or business cycle similarities as 
prominent examples – absolute and relative information on the involved industries are helpful 
in identifying industries particularly prone to collusion (probably suggesting targeted further 
detection activities by the competition authority or the respective firms themselves). 
 In absolute terms and over the entire observation period from 2001 to 2015, our 
quantitative assessment reveals that the large majority of 89 out of the in sum 113 cartel cases 
(i.e., about 79 percent) took place in manufacturing, followed by 8 cartels in transportation 
and storage and 6 cartels in financial and insurance activities. The remaining 10 cartels are 
distributed over the remaining industries as follows: 3 cartels in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing as well as in wholesale and retail trade, 2 cartels in electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply and finally 1 cartel in the categories construction and arts, entertainment 
and recreation, respectively. In relative terms, Figure 6 shows the development of the 
respective yearly shares for the entire observation period from 2001 to 2015.  
 
                                                     
18  Interestingly, in December 2015, an appeal of several airlines against the Commission decision with the 
General Court was successful – partly due to the unclear determination of the nature and scope of the 
agreement fined by the Commission. See General Court of the European Union, “The General Court annuls 
the decision by which the Commission imposed fines amounting to approximately €790 million on several 
airlines for their participation in a cartel on the air freight market”, Press Release No 14 7/15, Luxembourg, 
16 December 2015. 
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Figure 6: Share of industries involved in cartelization 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Due to large absolute number of cartel cases in manufacturing, it does not come as a surprise 
that this industry is also dominant in terms of yearly shares. While the lowest share of 50 
percent of all cases was reached in 2012, the years 2004, 2006 and 2007 exclusively had cases 
from the manufacturing industry. The observations for all other industries are essentially too 
small and erratic to allow an insightful interpretation of particular patterns. 
3.4 Affected countries  
In addition to the involved industries, the countries affected by cartel agreements provide 
further interesting insights for at least three reasons. First, again referring to cartel theory, it 
appears, ceteris paribus, more challenging to form and stabilize a cartel agreement with firms 
stemming from a larger number of different countries; for example, as the respective firms 
might not only have different expectations and mentalities or speak different languages 
(leading to a more difficult and possibly error-prone communication) but also because they 
might face different economic situations in their home countries (possibly leading to different 
deviation incentives). Second, information on the number of affected countries allow an 
investigation of the often raised claim that cartels have become more and more international 
in the last one or two decades. Third, general information on the number of involved firm 
groups per country gives away at least some information on the respective competition 
climate and the functioning of the respective competition policy regimes. 
 Starting our characterization of the affected countries with some absolute numbers for our 
entire observation period from 2001 to 2015, Figure 7 shows all countries involved into at 
least one cartel case and the respective absolute number of involved firms per country.  
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Figure 7: Number of involved firms per country 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As revealed by Figure 7, while only 44 out of a total of 194 countries worldwide were 
involved in at least one cartel case with the European Commission, consulting the ranking of 
the 20 largest economies in the world (by nominal IMF GDP data) reveals that only India, 
Russia, Indonesia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia were not involved in any of the cartel cases 
decided by the Commission between 2001 and 2015.  
 Furthermore, as further shown by Figure 7, in sum 233 German firms were involved in EU 
cartel decisions in the observation period from 2001 to 2015 with France (130 firms), the 
United Kingdom (122 firms) and the Netherlands (119 firms) being the runner-ups. In sum, 
the firms out of these four economically large European countries alone represent about 50 
percent of all firms involved in one or more EU cartel cases.19  
 Complementary to the presentation and discussion of absolute values, an analysis of 
relative values over time is likely to generate additional insights. Figure 8 below therefore 
plots the respective percentage shares by decision year for the following five geographical 
regions (1) Northern Europe, (2) Southern Europe, (3) Western Europe, (4) Eastern Europe 
and (5) Non-Europe.  
                                                     
19  Please note that the respective firm groups are counted on a case-basis, i.e., if companies were involved, e.g., 
two or three times as part of different cartels, they also appear in the respective statistics – plotted in Figure 7 
above – two or three times. However, even without double-counting, Germany would still be at the top of the 
list with 192 involved firms. 
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Figure 8: Origin of involved firms per country 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 8, Western Europe has – in all years of the observation period – the 
highest shares spanning a range from 36 percent in 2011 to 69 percent in 2003. While at least 
one of the Southern European countries were involved in one or more cartels in most of the 
years of the observation period, the rather small presence of Eastern European countries 
mostly concentrates on the second half of the observation period. Interestingly, participation 
of Non-European cartel members appears to follow a wave pattern with significant shares 
towards the beginning of the observation period, however, then followed by a substantial 
reduction of the respective share. While the years 2010 to 2012 experienced again a 
substantial share increase – reaching the highest value of 43 percent in 2012 – the last three 
years again show a reduced share of Non-European firms out of the entire group of cartel 
members.  
 Complementary to a discussion of absolute and relative values with respect to the number 
of affected countries, it adds value to study the average number of countries in a cartel. Figure 
9 provides the respective information based on the decision year. The documented clear 
increase in the average number of countries in a cartel in the first few years of the new 
century supports the above view of an increasing share of international cartels. However, as 
also shown in Figure 9, after reaching the peak in 2010, the subsequent years show a 
declining trend in the average number of countries in a cartel.  
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Figure 9: Average number of countries in a cartel 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Although we are unable to substantiate this descriptive finding any further in the remainder of 
this paper, two developments may have driven the observed trends. On the one hand, the 
detection of more and more international cartels reflects the increased cooperation efforts by 
competition authorities within the European Union – first and foremost through the European 
Competition Network (ECN) – but also worldwide though (less formal) cooperation efforts as 
part of the International Competition Network (ICN). On the other hand, the increasing 
number of involved countries might also be explained by an increased pace in the 
globalization of markets in earlier years that led to an increased desire to reduce or even 
eliminate the rising international competitive pressures through cartel agreements.  
3.5 Types of infringement 
In the industrial organization textbook by Pepall et al. (1999, p. 345), a cartel is defined as a 
“… group of firms who have agreed explicitly among themselves to coordinate their activities 
in order to raise market price ...”. Consequently, all types of explicit agreements among direct 
competitors that are expected to raise market price are considered as explicit (and therefore 
illegal) cartel. Although this definition certainly includes the classical price-fixing agreement, 
it is not limited to it as also agreements on quantity fixing, market sharing, exchange of 
information or bid-rigging typically aim at increasing market price and are therefore also 
categorized as explicit cartel agreements.  
 Turning to the presentation of our quantitative findings, it is important to mention upfront 
that – although several cases exist in which only one clear type of infringement was 
implemented – the majority of cartels were found to operate with a mixture of two or more 
different types of infringement. This is clearly reflected in the absolute numbers for the entire 
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observation period from 2001 to 2015 finding elements of direct price-fixing in 94 out of 113 
cartel cases. Furthermore, while 62 cartels included some form of market sharing and 50 
cartels contained some form of illegal exchange of information, only 26 cartels showed 
sufficient evidence for quantity fixing. Bid rigging evidence was found in only 4 cartels.  
 In relative terms, Figure 10 below provides further insights on a yearly basis. With only 
few exceptions in recent years, price-fixing appears as dominant form in the organization of a 
cartel with shares between 32 percent in 2015 and 67 percent in 2011 – based on the number 
of decided cartel cases in the respective years.  
 
Figure 10: Types of infringement 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Interestingly, as also shown in Figure 10, the role of quantity fixing seem to erode over the 
observation period even disappearing entirely in 2013 and 2014. At the same time, cartels in 
which an exchange of information was involved gained in shares in recent years – even 
challenging the role of market sharing as the second most prominent type of infringement. 
One possible reason for this development could be seen in a certain closeness of this type of 
infringement to the (legal) alternative of tacit collusion, i.e. by applying such forms of explicit 
collusion, firms might hope to either avoid punishment or to at least complicate detection (in 
combination with a reduction in the severity of the infringement leading to lower fines). 
3.6 Types of cartel breakdown  
The type of cartel breakdown is a further characteristic of potential interest in studying EU 
cartel cases. Generally, two broad types of cartel breakdown can be differentiated: detected 
while ongoing or natural death. While the former category comprises all cases in which the 
cartel was detected by the European Commission while still operating – e.g., through an 
application of specific detection tools such as a leniency program – the latter category 
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contains cartels that ceased to exist due to natural reasons – such as market entry, disputes 
among cartel members, technological change etc. – before they were detected by the 
European Commission at a later point in time. 
 In absolute terms and over the entire observation period from 2001 to 2015, in 56 out of 
113 cartel cases, the cartel died of natural causes and was later detected by the European 
Commission. In the remaining 57 cases, the detection of the cartel by the European 
Commission was causal for the breakdown of the cartel. In relative terms, Figure 11 below 
shows the respective yearly values for the two bases ‘decision year’ and ‘year of cartel 
cessation’. 
  
Figure 11: Types of cartel breakdown by year of decision and of cartel cessation 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Focusing on the left-hand chart in Figure 11 first, it is generally revealed that the two types of 
cartel breakdown fluctuate quite substantially between the years leading to in sum roughly 
equal shares over the entire observation period. However, when the basis of analysis is 
changed from decision year to year of cartel cessation in the right-hand chart in Figure 11, 
partly substantial differences in the yearly pattern – however, only slight changes with respect 
to overall shares – are revealed. In particular, the apparent substantial increase in the ‘detected 
while ongoing’ category in the last few years can be taken as piece of evidence for an 
increasingly active detection of cartel cases by the Commission, e.g., through the application 
of leniency programs or international cooperation within the ECN or the ICN. 
 More generally, in thinking about the significance of both types of cartel breakdown, it 
could be argued that the ‘detected while ongoing’ cases are more valuable to society as they 
end a still ongoing (harmful) infringement of competition law. However, although this 
argument has some merit, there is no doubt that detecting and deciding on cartel cases that 
experienced an earlier natural death certainly remains an important enforcement activity as 
well – first and foremost for deterrence purposes.  
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3.7 Cartel duration 
The final characteristic of our quantitative assessment of EU cartel cases decided between 
2001 and 2015 is the duration of cartels. In general, cartel duration is expected to be 
dependent on a multitude of different factors – including partly those cartel characteristics 
already discussed in earlier sections above. As a consequence, any descriptive quantitative 
analysis – being unable to control for the possible impacts of a multitude of different factors 
in parallel – must be exceptionally careful in the interpretation of the obtained averages and 
simple correlations.  
 The usual starting point for an assessment of cartel duration is the number of months the 
respective cartels existed before they either died of natural causes or were detected by the 
European Commission. In this respect, Figure 12 below plots the total cartel duration 
separately for all 113 cartel cases decided in our observation period (ordered by the date of 
detection). 
  
Figure 12: Total cartel duration of all 113 cartel cases (in months, by year of detection) 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 12, the total duration values fluctuate quite substantially with the shortest 
cartel – a subcartel of the Automotive wire harnesses case (Case COMP/39.748) –showing a 
total duration of only 2 months while the longest cartel – the Animal Feed Phosphates cartel 
(Case COMP/38.866) – lasted for 419 months, i.e. nearly 35 years. On average over the entire 
observation period, a cartel lasted for 87 months – allowing the important general conclusion 
that firms are regularly able to install and sustain workable cartel agreements. Furthermore, 
although the shorter duration of cartels that were detected more recently already becomes 
apparent from Figure 12, we will discuss this observation in greater detail in the subsequent 
analysis of average yearly duration values. Finally yet importantly, differentiating between the 
two types of cartel breakdown discussed in the previous section, we find that cartels dying of 
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natural causes lasted shorter – showing an average duration of 77 months – compared to 
cartels that were detected by the Commission (showing a duration of 97 months on average).  
 Starting to think further about the most suitable basis for a meaningful analysis of cartel 
duration, our general discussion in Section 3.1 above identified three different possible bases: 
the year of decision, the year of detection and the year of cartel cessation – with particularly 
the letter two appearing as suitable bases for an assessment of cartel duration. Figure 13 
below therefore shows the average yearly cartel duration by year of detection and year of 
cartel cessation.  
 
Figure 13: Average cartel duration by year of detection and year of cartel cessation 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Starting our discussion with the results for the detection year, the left-hand chart in Figure 13 
shows that average cartel length fluctuates quite substantially within the spectrum of 40 
months in 2011 and 170 months in 2004. However, subdividing our observation period into 
the three equally-sized subperiods of five years each reveals that the average duration first 
increased from 72 months in the 2001-2005 period to 112 months in the 2006-2010 period; 
however, subsequently experienced a substantial reduction in the average duration to about 51 
months in the most recent 2011-2015 period. In other words, the recently detected cartel cases 
were shorter and therefore most-likely also less harmful than the earlier cartels that partly 
reached average durations of more than 12 years. This development – which is found to be 
even more pronounced in the analysis based on the year of cartel cessation shown in the right-
hand chart in Figure 13 – can be seen as piece of evidence for a successful EU cartel policy in 
the last two decades. 
 Subsequent to the study of the developments of average cartel durations over time, the 
respective duration information on the cartel-level can be combined with further 
characteristics of cartels discussed above. However, due to the fact that a multivariate 
regression approach would be needed to disentangle the separate (potential) drivers of cartel 
duration, we would like to limit our further discussions to the relationships between cartel 
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duration and the involved industry as well as the type of infringement (both shown in Figure 
14 below). 
  
Figure 14: Cartel duration by involved industry and type of infringement  
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As revealed by the left-hand chart in Figure 14, cartels in the electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply industry are found to have lasted the longest with an average duration of 
about 158 months. However, as discussed in Section 3.3 above, only two cartels were decided 
in the entire observation period in this industry thus limiting the insights gained from this 
finding. Cartels in the manufacturing industry – comprising about 79 percent of all cartels in 
the observation period – are found second with an average duration of 95 months (and 
therefore clearly above the average of 87 months for cartel duration across all industries).  
  Turning to average cartel durations for the different types of infringement – shown in the 
right-hand chart in Figure 14 – bid rigging infringements are found to last longest with an 
average duration of 136 months, followed by quantity fixing (113 months), market sharing 
(110 months), price fixing (88 months) and exchange of information (67 months). However, it 
is important to remind that particularly bid rigging cartels are rather rare occurrences with in 
sum only 4 cases in our observation period. Furthermore, our discussions in Section 3.5 
revealed that cartel agreements that included some form of illegal exchange of information 
increased its share substantially in recent years – a period that is also characterized by a 
reduced average duration of cartels. Both examples therefore suggest that any definite 
conclusions based on our descriptive quantitative analysis should be avoided.  
 Before we turn to a detailed characterization of the EU cartel enforcement process in the 
subsequent chapter, we close this section with the presentation and discussion of two scatter 
plots with cartel duration on the vertical axis and the following two variables – introduced and 
0
50
100
150
M
on
th
s
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
, f
or
es
try
an
d 
fis
hi
ng
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
, g
as
, s
te
am
an
d 
ai
r c
on
di
tio
ni
ng
 s
up
pl
y
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
W
ho
le
sa
le
 a
nd
re
ta
il 
tra
de
Tr
an
sp
or
tin
g
an
d 
st
or
ag
e
Fi
na
nc
ia
l a
nd
in
su
ra
nc
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
Ar
ts
, e
nt
er
ta
in
m
en
t
an
d 
re
cr
ea
tio
n
2001-2015
Average cartel duration by involved industry
0
50
100
150
M
on
th
s
Pr
ic
e 
fix
in
g
Q
ua
nt
ity
 fi
xi
ng
M
ar
ke
t s
ha
rin
g
Ex
ch
an
ge
 o
f
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
Bi
d 
rig
gi
ng
2001-2015
Average cartel duration by type of infringement
24 
 
discussed in previous sections above – on the horizontal axis: number of firms and combined 
market share20 (see Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15: Cartel duration vs. number of firms and combined market share 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Starting our discussion of Figure 15 with the left-hand chart, plotting firm groups against 
cartel duration first reveals a substantial variation in duration for cartels with an identical 
numbers of firm groups. For example, while the clear majority of cartels including two, four 
or six firm groups ended before reaching a duration of 100 months, all three categories also 
show cartels that managed to exist significantly longer. Considering all observations and 
including a simple regression curve reveals that on average cartel duration increases with the 
number of firm groups involved. Although surprising at first glance – having in mind the 
theoretical argument that cartels with an increasing number of firm groups are more difficult 
to implement and sustain – possible explanations are either a certain centralization of cartel 
organization activities by, e.g., an industry association or alternatively the fact that an 
increasing number of firm groups makes it more likely that the cartel includes all or nearly all 
firm groups operating in the industry (and therefore turns out to be more stable than cartels 
with a substantial number of outsiders).  
 In fact, whether the latter argument has some merit can be investigated further by using the 
right-hand chart in Figure 15. Plotting cartel duration against combined market shares indeed 
reveals that cartels with higher combined market shares last longer than cartels with lower 
combined market shares. However, as indicated by the small slope of the regression curve, the 
effect appears to be rather small.  
                                                     
20  As already mentioned in Section 3.2 above, missing information on combined market shares allows us to 
include only 51 cases.  
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4 Characterization of the EU Cartel Enforcement Process from 2001 to 2015 
In this section, we complement our assessment of EU cartel cases with a detailed quantitative 
analysis of the EU cartel enforcement process – subdivided further into (1) its duration, (2) 
types of cartel detection, (3) the leniency program, (4) the settlement procedure (5) fines 
imposed by the European Commission and (6) the appeals process with the General Court 
(GC) and (possibly) the European Court of Justice (ECJ).   
4.1 Duration of the enforcement process 
As already sketched in Section 2.1 above, the EU cartel enforcement process can broadly be 
subdivided further into two main stages: detection, investigation and decision by the European 
Commission and the (optional) investigation and decision of the General Court as first-stage 
appellate court and the European Court of Justice as the second-stage and highest appellate 
court in cartel cases in the European Union. In the following two subsections, we present 
initial general information on the duration of the respective processes in our observation 
period from 2001 to 2015. 
4.1.1 Duration of investigations by the EC  
The natural starting point for an assessment of the duration of the cartel enforcement process 
is the analysis of the total duration of the EC investigations on a case-by-case basis. Facing 
the need to identify the respective start and end dates, the latter is rather easy to define with 
the date of the EC decision. The choice of the start date of the investigation, however, is less 
trivial and offers several alternatives such as, e.g., the date of a dawn raid, the allocation of a 
case number, the opening of official proceedings etc. In the following, we consistently use the 
earliest event explicitly mentioned in the decision documents (e.g., the date of the first 
leniency application) as start date of the investigation. Figure 16 below plots the resulting 
durations for all 90 decided cases in our database (ordered by decision date).   
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Figure 16: Time span between beginning of investigation and decision 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 16, the duration of EC investigations fluctuates quite substantially with 
the shortest case being below 20 months and the longest case overtopping the 100 months 
threshold. In the years 2009 and especially 2010, a substantial increase in the duration of case 
investigations is found – possibly related to the large number of firm groups that were 
involved in the respective cases (see Section 3.1 above for quantitative evidence) and the 
experimental stage of the settlement procedure (discussed further in Section 4.4 below). The 
specific situation in the year 2010 is also reflected in the average duration of EC 
investigations – again based on the decision year – shown in Figure 17 below.   
  
Figure 17: Average duration of investigations by EC 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As further revealed by Figure 17, the average duration of EC investigations followed an 
increasing trend from 2001 onwards until the largest average duration was reached in 2010. 
This is also reflected in the average values when again applying our three five-year periods: 
the average duration increased from 46 months in the 2001-2005 period to 57 months in the 
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2006-2010 period. However, interestingly, the most recent and final period from 2011-2015 is 
then characterized by a clear decrease in the average duration of EU investigations to 48 
months. Although a more detailed investigation of possible drivers behind this development 
will be provided in Section 4.4 below, the introduction of the settlement procedure in 2008 – 
taking first effect in the year 2011 – might at least be part of the answer. 
 Before we turn to the duration of investigations by the two appellate court stages in EU 
cartel cases in the subsequent section, an analysis of the time span between the end of the 
cartel and the beginning of the investigation promises to provide additional insights – in light 
of the finding in Section 3.6 above that about half of all cartel cases were detected after the 
natural death of the conspiracy. Figure 18 below therefore plots the respective time span on a 
case-by-case basis (ordered by decision date).  
  
Figure 18: Time span between cartel end and beginning of investigation 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 18, the decided cases can be subdivided further into cases in which the 
investigation started immediately – i.e., cases in which the EC detected the infringement – 
represented by the absence of any bar of visible size in Figure 18 and cases in which the EC 
received knowledge of the cartel after it was already terminated. Concentrating our further 
discussions on the latter group of cases, Figure 18 generally reveals that – over time – the 
share of older cartels that were eventually detected by the EC increased significantly. While 
the first subperiod from 2001-2005 shows an average duration of about 13 months, the time 
gap increased to 17 months in the 2006-2010 period and to 23 months in the most recent 
2011-2015 period. The introduction and reform of the leniency program – discussed in greater 
detail in Section 4.3 below – together with increased compliance efforts within firms also 
allowing the internal detection of past cartels – might have contributed to this development.  
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4.1.2 Duration of investigations by the General Court/European Court of Justice 
Subsequent to a cartel decision by the European Commission, the respective cartel members 
have the possibility to appeal the decision with the General Court (GC) as first-stage appellate 
court and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as second-stage and highest appellate court for 
cartel cases in the European Union. While a detailed quantitative assessment of the appellate 
stages will be provided in Section 4.6 below, Figure 19 presents the respective average 
duration of both stages based on the decision date. 
  
Figure 19: Average duration of investigations by GC/ECJ 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 19, the average duration of GC investigations experienced a significant 
increase in the first half of the (shorter) observation period from 2001 to 2012; however, was 
subsequently followed by a comparable decrease in the second half. Expressed in numbers, 
while the first six year period from 2001-2006 shows an average duration of 52 months, the 
second six year period from 2007-2012 is characterized by a slightly lower average duration 
of 50 months. Arithmetically, these differences are largely driven by the clear reductions in 
the number of cases in the years 2011 and 2012 – which might change in the years to come if 
pending GC cases will be decided.  
 Turning from the average duration of investigations by the GC to the respective results for 
the ECJ, it is important to remind that both courts differ with respect to their activity 
spectrum. While the former reinvestigates the entire case – therefore leading to investigation 
durations comparable to the Commission’s – the ECJ investigation is limited to a review 
whether existing laws and regulations were applied correctly. This substantially limited 
activity spectrum is also reflected in a substantial reduction in the average duration of an ECJ 
investigation (compared to the GC stage). In fact, as revealed by Figure 19, the average 
duration not only started at a level roughly half of that of GC investigations but even shows 
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further reductions in subsequent years. However, the fact that several cases are still pending 
either at the GC or the ECJ is again likely to change the respective more recent values as more 
and more final GC/ECJ decisions will become available (see, e.g., Smuda et al. (2015) for an 
econometric analysis of the determinants of appellate court decisions in EU cartel cases).   
4.2 Type of cartel detection  
Subsequent to an initial characterization of the duration of the cartel enforcement process, the 
natural starting point of a closer investigation of the separate enforcement stages is a 
discussion of the type of cartel detection. Although our discussions on the type of cartel 
breakdown in Section 3.6 above already provided some insights in this respect – namely by 
differentiating between cartels that were ended by detection through the EC and cartels that 
ceased to exist due to natural causes – this perspective can be extended further through a 
categorization of all cases into (1) commission investigation (CI)21 that ends the cartel, (2) CI 
after the cartel ended, (3) leniency program (LP) application that ends the cartel, and (4) LP 
application after the cartel ended. In other words, by applying the described categorization, 
we are not only able to differentiate between the relative importance of the two most 
important detection instruments – CI and LP – but we are also in the position to link this 
knowledge with information whether the respective tools ended the infringements or were 
rather applied at a later point in time. Figure 20 below presents the respective shares of the 
four categories over time based on the year of detection.  
 
Figure 20: Types of cartel detection 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
                                                     
21  The ‘commission investigation’ (CI) variable consists of several different detection tools such as particularly 
complaints and information provided by other competition authorities (or other comparable sources). As such 
more detailed information is only available for a rather small number of cases, a further differentiation of the 
CI variable would have resulted in a substantial reduction of the size of the sample. 
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As generally shown in Figure 20, the different types of cartel detection fluctuate quite 
substantially over time. While in four years of the entire observation period – 1995, 1996, 
2004 and 2013 – only one detection type was applied, the majority of in sum 12 years shows a 
combination of either three or all four types.  
 Aiming at identifying certain trends in the detection of cartels, it becomes apparent that the 
first two thirds of the observation period were characterized by a relatively large share of CI-
related cartel detection – first and foremost after the end of the cartel agreement but also – on 
a regular basis – in cases where the CI caused the end of the cartel. However, since 2007, both 
forms lost in importance leading to a corresponding increase in LP-related cartel detection. 
This general observation is in line with various statements from officials from competition 
authorities reporting that LPs have turned out to be such an effective detection tool that CI-
related activities are simply not needed to a larger degree to fully use existing staff capacities.      
 Furthermore, as also shown in Figure 20, the shares of LPs as detection tool applied after 
the cartel ended gained in importance substantially in recent years. Although admittedly 
speculative, the existence of LPs is likely to have promoted the incentives of firms to come 
forward with sufficient proof of a former cartel in exchange for a fine reduction or even a fine 
waiver (before another former cartel member decides to do so). A more detailed 
characterization of the leniency program is provided in the following section.  
4.3 Leniency program  
A leniency program (LP) generally offers law infringers (i.e., individuals or companies) either 
a fine reduction of even full amnesty if they disclose an infringement to the responsible 
authority and (fully) cooperate with it in the subsequent investigation. The degree of fine 
reduction typically depends on the point in time at which the infringer submits evidence (i.e., 
before or after the authority has started an investigation) and what kind of evidence is brought 
forward (i.e., how helpful the evidence is in proving the infringement).  
 In the EU, the absence of fines for individuals involved in a cartel agreement directly 
implies a focus on corporate leniency programs only. The original version of such a program 
for cartel infringements was introduced in 199622 followed by two revisions: a substantial one 
in 200223 and a comparably minor one in 200624. The conditions for a leniency-related fine 
                                                     
22  Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, Official Journal of the 
European Commission, C 207, 1996, 4-6. 
23  Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, Official Journal of the 
European Commission, C 45, 2002, 3-5. 
24  Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, Official Journal of the 
European Commission, C 298, 2006, 17-22. 
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reduction or even amnesty were initially set out in the ‘Commission Notice on the Non-
Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases’ of 1996. The notice defined three different 
categories of fine reductions: (1) Non-imposition of a fine or a very substantial reduction in its 
amount (at least 75% up to total exemption), (2) substantial reduction in a fine (between 50% 
and 75%), and (3) significant reduction in a fine (between 10% and 50%).  
 Fine reductions in the categories (1) and (2) were granted to firms which met the following 
criteria: (a) it is the first to adduce decisive evidence of the cartel's existence; (b) it puts an 
end to its involvement in the illegal activity no later than the time at which it discloses the 
cartel; (c) it provides the Commission with all the relevant information and all the documents 
and evidence available to it regarding the cartel and maintains continuous and complete 
cooperation throughout the investigation; and (d) it has not compelled another enterprise to 
take part in the cartel and has not acted as an instigator or played a determining role in the 
illegal activity. In order to qualify for a category (1) fine reduction, the firm additionally must 
have informed the Commission about a secret cartel before the Commission has started to 
undertake an investigation. Firms who cooperated with the Commission without having met 
all the conditions set out under (a) to (d) above still had the possibility to benefit from a 
category (3) fine reduction.  
 Although the first EC leniency program already generated a significant number of cases of 
self-reporting, a lack of transparency was identified as key obstacle for an even greater 
adoption. In particular, even if a firm met all the requirements mentioned above, it still would 
have faced a substantial uncertainty whether it qualified for full immunity from fines. With 
the first revision of the Notice in 2002, the EC aimed at improving the identified transparency 
problems by particularly guaranteeing full immunity from fines with certainty for the first 
firm that submits sufficient evidence enabling the Commission to adopt a decision to carry out 
an investigation. Applications that do not meet these high standards can still qualify for a 
reduction of 30 percent to 50 percent for the first runner-up, 20 percent to 30 percent for the 
second and up to 20 percent for all other firms if the reported evidence provides ‘significant 
added value’.  
 In its second (minor) revision of the program in 2006, the EC, on the one hand, specified 
several procedures, most notably the rules for submission by introducing an explicit list of the 
evidence’s content in the form of a corporate statement. On the other hand, a marker system 
was introduced that basically aims at securing the correct place of the reporting firm in the 
order of all reporting cartel members.   
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 Turning from the brief general set-up (and further development) of the leniency program in 
the European Union to a quantitative analysis of the 90 decided cases in our observation 
period, in sum 33 decisions were taken by the Commission on the basis of the 1996 leniency 
notice, compared to 32 decisions under the 2002 notice and 25 decisions under the 2006 
notice. Although this aggregated information already allows the conclusion that the leniency 
program was regularly applied, more information on particularly the development of the 
application numbers of the program over time as well as the average reduction reached is 
necessary to further assess the impact and success of the program (and its revisions). Figure 
21 below therefore provides the respective information for the entire observation period from 
2001 to 2015.  
 
Figure 21: Application rate and average reduction 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Starting the discussion of Figure 21 with the application rates, it is revealed that they diverge 
quite substantially during the observation period. While the first subperiod from 2001-2005 
shows a rather high average application rate of 79 percent, the subsequent period from 2006-
2010 was characterized by a significant drop to 56 percent. However, the most recent five-
year period from 2011-2015 again shows an increase in the application rate to 63 percent. 
Although admittedly speculative, one reason for the temporary decrease in the application rate 
could be seen in the uncertainties created by the substantial revision of the leniency notice in 
2002 described above. Once the Commission clarified these issues through a consistent 
application of the new rules, the respective firm groups again more and more decided to apply 
for leniency (see generally Hoang et al. (2014) for an econometric approach to the question of 
determinants of self-reporting as part of the EC leniency program).  
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 Turning from the application rate to the average reduction due to leniency, Figure 21 also 
shows the respective values excluding the respective key witness.25 The average reduction 
over the entire observation period is found to lie at 29 percent, with only limited variation as 
reflected in the three averages for the subperiods: 28 percent for both the 2001-2005 period 
and the 2006-2010 period and 32 percent for the most recent 2011-2015 period. However, 
especially the recent measurable increase together with the (again) high application rates 
suggest that the leniency policy is an important and functioning tool of contemporary EU 
cartel policy.  
 Before we turn to a discussion of a further and more recently introduced tool promising 
further fine reductions – the settlement procedure – our assumption in Section 4.2 above that 
the leniency program is creating a certain tension in cartel agreements – possibly leading to a 
race to the enforcer’s door – deserves a further investigation. For this purpose, Figure 22 not 
only shows the number of leniency applicants but also the temporal order of the incoming 
applications.  
 
Figure 22: Temporal order of leniency program applications 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Due to data limitations, Figure 22 only displays the temporal order for in sum 50 decided 
cases ordered by decision date. In 11 out of these 50 cases, only one firm group decided to 
apply for leniency, leaving 39 cases for an assessment of the temporal order of the at least two 
applications. As suggested by the figure, a ‘race to the enforcer’s door’, i.e., two or more 
applications handed in in a very short time frame seems to be the exception rather than the 
rule with in sum only 9 cases showing the respective characteristics. In the majority of cases, 
a substantial amount of time passes by before further applicants decided to come forward and 
                                                     
25  As the key witness typically receives a fine waiver, its inclusion would complicate an interpretation of the 
results shown in Figure 21. 
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apply for leniency. In other words, the majority of further leniency applications is received 
while the European Commission is already investigating the case – suggesting that firms 
decide to apply at the point in time at which it becomes sufficiently likely that the 
Commission has sufficient evidence to fine the respective cartel members (but a leniency 
application is still likely to result in a fine reduction of 10 to 20 percent).  
4.4 Settlement procedure  
The EU Settlement Procedure was introduced in late June 2008 with Regulation 622/200826 
and a Commission Notice27 on the conduct of settlement procedures. It enables the European 
Commission to close investigations faster by eliminating or reducing several procedural steps 
– such as full access to file, drafting and translations or oral hearings and interpretation – 
required under the standard procedure. Parties who admit liability and waive these procedural 
rights receive a discount of 10 percent on the final fine imposed. Through the introduction of 
the settlement notice, the EU aims at enabling “… the Commission to handle faster and more 
efficiently cartel cases …”28 thus freeing up resources for additional cases and strengthening 
the deterrence effect of cartel enforcement.  
 Aiming at providing descriptive quantitative evidence on the significance and impact of the 
settlement procedure – particularly on the duration of EC cartel investigations – Figure 23 
plots the development of the number of cases decided by the European Commission from 
2001 to 2015.  As revealed by Figure 23, between 2010 and 2015, we observe in sum 18 
settled cases out of which 5 cases29 were hybrid settlements in which typically one of the 
companies decided to opt out of the settlement procedure. Furthermore, the first two cases – 
settled in 201030 – were special in the sense that they were converted into settlement cases 
relatively late in the investigation process thus questioning them as ‘typical’ settlement cases.  
 
                                                     
26  Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as 
regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, OJ L 171/3, 1.7.2008. Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 123/18, 27.4.2004) lays down rules concerning the participation of 
the parties concerned in such proceedings.  
27  Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of decisions pursuant to 
Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases (2008/C 167/01), OJ C 167/1, 
2.7.2008. 
28  Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008, OJ L 171/3, p. 1. 
29  The cases are Animal Feed Phosphates (Case COMP/38.866), Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (Case 
COMP/39.861), Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (Case COMP/39.914), Steel Abrasives (Case COMP/39.792) 
and Mushrooms (Case COMP/39.965).  
30  The cases are DRAMs (Case COMP/38.511) and Animal Feed Phosphates (Case COMP/38.866). 
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Figure 23: Number and types of decided cases 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Although Figure 23 certainly provides valuable insights on the increasing significance of the 
settlement procedure in recent cartel cases, the clearly communicated aim of the introduction 
of this additional policy tool was to shorten the duration of EC investigations. Aiming at 
investigating this issue further, Figure 24 plots the length of the EC investigation for all cases 
decided between 2001 and 2015.  
     
Figure 24: Duration before/after the statement of objection (SO) 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As the settlement procedure is expected to shorten especially the time need from the so-called 
statement of objections31 (SO) to the decision, we subdivide the entire investigation period 
(on the vertical axis) into start of investigation up to the SO and from the SO to the final 
decision by the European Commission. The horizontal axis orders the case numbers according 
to their decision dates, i.e., the last case decided by the EC in 2015 is located at the very right 
                                                     
31  The statement of objections (SO) is a written document in which the Commission informs the parties 
concerned of the objections raised against them.  
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of the figure. Furthermore, aiming at identifying possible differences between settled and non-
settled cases, Figure 24 further introduces separate colors for both stages of the settled cases 
(as also defined in the legend to the figure).  
 Abstracting from the few outliers with unusually long first or second stages, the probably 
most apparent finding of Figure 24 is the substantial reduction in the duration of the second 
stage for settled cases. As it is further revealed that the first stage of the respective settled 
cases does not show a substantial duration increase compared to their non-settled counterparts 
in the pre-settlement era – i.e., the respective post-SO activities are not simply shifted to the 
pre-SO stage32 – it can be said that our quantitative evidence supports the conclusion that the 
introduction of the settlement notice reached its main aim of reducing the overall duration of 
the EC cartel enforcement process (see Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015) for an 
econometric approach confirming this key result). 
 Another interesting observation has to do with the duration of non-settled cases since the 
EU Settlement Procedure was implemented. Here we see a clear increase in the duration of 
particularly the second stage (compared to the pre-settlement era) suggesting that the EC 
might prioritize settled cases over non-settled cases in their everyday work leading to a 
substantial increase in the duration of non-settled cases. 
4.5 Fines imposed by the European Commission 
The fine levels imposed by the European Commission on the respective cartel members are 
the key output of the entire cartel investigation and decision process. By imposing fines, the 
European Commission basically pursues two interrelated goals: punishing detected breaches 
of competition law and deterring future infringements. Aiming at implementing both goals in 
a transparent and effective fashion, the EC introduced first ‘Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines’ in 199833 which were revised substantially in 200634. In our observation period 
from 2001 to 2015, the 1998 fine guidelines were applied in 44 decisions, compared to 46 
decisions in which the new 2006 fine guidelines were used. In the remainder of this section, 
we concentrate on the EC fine setting process as specified in the 2006 fine guidelines which 
can broadly be subdivided further into (1) the derivation of the basic amount of the fine, (2) 
fine adjustments due to the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors, and (3) the fixing of 
the overall fine imposed. 
                                                     
32  While the settled cases show an average length of 41 months from the beginning to the SO, the non-settled 
cases have an average of 35 months. 
33  Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines, Official Journal of the European Commission, C 9, 1998, 3-5. 
34  Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines, Official Journal of the European Commission, C 210, 2006, 2-5. 
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Derivation of the basic amount of the fine 
According to the 2006 fine guidelines, the derivation of the basic amount of the fine 
essentially depends on (1) the firm’s turnover, (2) the gravity and (3) the duration of the 
infringement. In an initial step, the EC determines the firm's turnover of the relevant product 
in the affected market generated in the last full business year preceding the end of the 
infringement. The basic amount of the fine can reach up to 30 percent of these relevant sales 
depending further on, first, the gravity of the infringement (measured by factors such as the 
type of infringement, the combined market share and the geographic scope of the 
infringement). Second, the basic amount of the fine is directly influenced by the duration of 
the infringement. After fixing the appropriate percentage of the firm's cartel sales, the EC 
adds a duration multiplier, equal to the number of years in which the cartel was active. 
Furthermore, a so-called ‘entry-fee’ of 15 percent to 25 percent might be levied on top – 
particularly for shorter cartels.   
Fine adjustments due to the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
Subsequently, the EC might adjust the basic amount of the fine by taking account of so-called 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Factors that can lead to an increase in the fine 
include ringleader status or recidivism – e.g., for repeat offenders the fine can be increased by 
up to 100 percent for each prior infringement – while passive membership in the cartel or 
cooperation efforts (outside the leniency program) might reduce the basic amount of the fine. 
From a quantitative perspective, Figure 25 below shows the yearly percentages of firm groups 
who faced aggravating and/or mitigating factors over the entire observation period from 2001 
to 2015.  
  
Figure 25: Percentage of firm groups with aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
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Starting a detailed discussion of Figure 25 with the role of aggravating factors, it is shown that 
they played a significant role in roughly the first two-thirds of the observation period reaching 
percentage shares of close to 50 percent in 2003. However, since 2011, these factors 
substantially lost in relevance reflected in only one case in 2014 in which aggravating factors 
played a (small) role. In comparison, although also mitigating factors lost in importance 
substantially – particularly between 2005 and 2009 – the more recent years show a 
remarkable variation in the respective values overtopping the 40 percent threshold in 2011 
and facing a drop to almost 0 percent in the year after. However, in contrast to the aggravating 
factors, mitigating factors were applied more consistently showing cases in every single year 
of the observation period. 
 Aiming at investigating the reduced role of both aggravating and mitigating factors a bit 
further, Figure 26 differentiates between different reasons within both factors. As shown in 
the left-hand chart in Figure 26, recidivism is found to be the dominant aggravating factor by 
far. Furthermore, while the role of cartel leader was also regularly used as aggravating factor 
in earlier cases, the criterion played no role in more recent EC case decisions. All other 
reasons are found to be of minor importance. 
  
Figure 26: Types of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
Turning to the role of mitigating factors – plotted in the right-hand chart in Figure 26 – it is 
shown that both a minor role in the cartel and cooperation with the EC35 were the two 
dominant reasons for receiving a reduction of the basic amount of the fine. However, also the 
motivation by a public authority to initiate (or participate in) a cartel had a certain relevance 
in several years of the observation period.  
 
                                                     
35  Please note that this mitigating factor can be applied independent of the question whether the respective firm 
group has participated in the leniency program or not. 
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Fixing of the overall fine imposed 
After the derivation of the basic fine and the identification of possible aggravating or 
mitigating factors, the fixing of the overall fine eventually imposed on the cartel firm groups 
is conducted. According to the 2006 fine guidelines, the overall fine imposed must not exceed 
10 percent of the firm's annual total turnover. If the firm belongs to a group where the parent 
company exercised decisive influence over the operations of the subsidiary, the benchmark is 
the group's annual turnover instead of the individual firm's annual turnover. Furthermore, if 
the investigation started more than five years after the end of the infringement, no fine can be 
imposed. Finally yet importantly, a fine can be reduced in exceptional cases in which the firm 
proves its ‘inability to pay’ and the imposition of the full fine would seriously jeopardize the 
survival of the firm.  
 As starting point for our quantitative assessment of the overall fines imposed, Figure 27 
presents the absolute fines and the fines per firm group for the entire observation period from 
2001 to 2015. In interpreting Figure 27, it is important to have in mind that the plotted fines 
refer to the respective decisions of the Commission, i.e., they take increases or reductions due 
to the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors as well as reductions due to application of 
the leniency program, the settlement procedure, and/or the just mentioned further reasons into 
account; however, they ignore possible further reductions as part of a possible appeals 
process.  
  
Figure 27: Absolute fine and fine per firm group (before appeals) 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 27, both the sum of fines as well as the average fine per firm group 
experienced a substantial increase in the years following 2005. While the sum of fines values 
still shows large variation – at least partly being explained by the differences in the number 
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substantially smaller variation suggesting that firms convicted for cartelization in recent years 
on average have to pay larger fines than they would have paid for the same infringement in 
more distant years.36 Expressed in numbers, while the first five-year period from 2001 to 2005 
experienced an average fine per firm group of about €17 million37, the respective average 
value increased substantially to about €47 million in the 2006-2010 period. The most recent 
2011 to 2015 period experienced both the highest and the lowest fine per firm group – in 2013 
and 2015, respectively – resulting in an average value of €42 million. 
 Before we turn to a detailed discussion of the appeals process as the final stage of the 
entire EU cartel enforcement process, the derivation of basic amounts of fines and the 
subsequent various possibilities to face either increases or decreases of the basic fine suggest 
a final comparison of both values on a yearly basis for the entire observation period. Figure 28 
therefore plots the final fine (per firm) without any increases or decreases as well as the final 
fine (also per firm) as eventually imposed by the Commission. Furthermore, based on this 
information, the average percentage reduction is calculated and included into Figure 28 as 
dotted line. 
  
Figure 28: Final fine compared to maximum possible fine per firm 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 28, in the large majority of years in the observation period, the final fine 
stayed substantially below the maximum possible fine. In fact, the average reduction over the 
entire observation period lies at 45 percent, with the first five-year period from 2001-2005 
showing an average of 44 percent, compared to 34 percent in the 2006-2010 period and 57 
                                                     
36  Although four cartel cases were decided by the European Commission in 2015, the respective fines imposed 
were low resulting in the substantial reduction in both ‘sum of fines’ and ‘average fine per firm group’ shown 
in Figure 27. 
37  We deflated nominal fines using the Consumer Price Index for Europe taken from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (MEI) database. 
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percent in the final 2011-2015 period. Although the maximum possible fine reported here has 
no direct link to an economically optimal fine, the observation of substantial average 
reductions of basic fine levels raises the question whether current fines are still large enough 
to reach the optimal level of deterrence.  
4.6 Appeals  
The appeals process – or alternatively the judicial review process as often referred to in the 
EU – offers the losing party of an administrative (or court) decision the possibility to seek 
reconsideration of their arguments – possibly leading to a diverging decision by an appellate 
court. Without denying its important constitutional role or even status as a human right, it is 
reasonable to assume that the implementation of an appeals process is motivated by two main 
goals. First, the implementation of an appeals process aims at reducing the occurrence of legal 
errors (e.g., as parties are more likely to file an appeal if the first decision was erroneous or by 
providing incentives to lower court judges to avoid erroneous decisions). Second, appeals 
help to refine existing laws and regulations (e.g., by reassessments of experienced appellate 
courts but also by providing signals to lawmakers on the efficiency of existing laws and 
regulations). 
 Under EU competition law in general and for EC cartel cases in particular, the appellate 
court proceedings can be either one- or two-stage. At the first stage, a cartel member that 
believes to have serious concerns with a (fining) decision of the EC can file an appeal with the 
General Court (GC) of the European Union.38 The GC – previously known as the Court of 
First Instance (CFI) – is composed of at least one judge from each member state. According to 
Article 254 TFEU, judges are appointed ‘by common accord of the governments of the 
member states’ for a renewable term of six years. The GC sits in chambers of usually three or 
five judges. Substantively, four main categories of argument can broadly be distinguished in 
an appeal against an EC cartel decision: fine levels, procedural aspects, facts/standard of proof 
aspects, and substantive assessment issues. In any case, the first-stage appeal must be initiated 
within two months of the earlier; either the publication of the Commission’s decision or the 
notification of the firm group (Art. 263 TFEU). 
 Generally, the GC not only has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by 
the EC; it also has full jurisdiction to review the entire Commission decision (including a 
repetition of the full assessment process). In practice, however, the GC usually focuses on an 
assessment of the factors linked to the correct application of the respective law provisions 
                                                     
38  See the consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 177/01, 2010, 1-36. 
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such as cartel duration, the gravity of the infringement or the application of the leniency 
program. Typically, the GC does not aim at replacing the Commission’s assessment of 
evidence with its own.  
 At the second stage of the appeals process in EC cartel cases, judgments of the GC can be 
appealed before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the unsuccessful party, i.e., either the 
convicted firm, the EC itself or both. The ECJ is the highest European appellate court and also 
has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by the GC. However, in its 
proceedings, it limits itself to questions of law and has no jurisdiction to (re-)review the facts 
and analyze the evidence that the GC used to support its findings and decision.  
 Turning from a brief description of the appeals process in cartel cases to an initial 
quantitative assessment for our entire observation period from 2001 to 2015, out of a total of 
600 firm groups convicted by the Commission to pay a fine for cartelization, 296 firm groups 
decided to appeal the decision of the EC at the GC and 120 firm groups ended up in the 
second-stage (either by their own decision or due to an appeal by the EC). Figure 29 below 
provides a more detailed characterization by plotting the yearly numbers and rates of appeals 
against EC cartel decisions for our observation period from 2001 to 2015 (focusing on the 
respective GC decisions only). 
  
Figure 29: Number and rate of appeals (GC decisions only) 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As revealed by Figure 29, in the first ten years of the observation period, the number of 
appeals vary substantially with 39 appeals (2001) and 14 appeals (2003) delineating the 
spectrum. However, starting in 2011, the number of appeals experienced a substantial drop. 
While the average number of appeals in the 2001-2010 period is 25, the corresponding 
average for the 2011-2015 period is found to be substantially lower at only 9 appeals (a 
reduction of about 64 percent). 
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 In order to take account of the fact that different years show different numbers of decisions 
(with varying numbers of involved firms) and therefore different general possibilities to file 
an appeal, Figure 29 additionally plots the respective shares of firm groups that filed an 
appeal in the year of the respective EC decision. It is shown that the identified downward 
trend is confirmed by this alternative measure: while the 2001 to 2010 period saw an average 
appeal rate of 60 percent, the 2011 to 2015 period witnessed a substantial drop to 21 percent. 
Although various factors might have influenced this development – suggesting an 
econometric analysis as provided in Hellwig et al. (2016) – our descriptive findings here 
support the claim that the settlement procedure had a measurable impact on the number of 
appeals cases brought against EC cartel decisions. As one of the various requirements for a 
successful settlement with the EC is the admittance of liability for an illegal agreement of a 
certain scope and value of affected sales, the probability of a successful appeal is reduced 
substantially for settled cases – thus limiting appeals cases mostly to the (smaller and further 
shrinking population of) firm groups that decided not to settle with the Commission.   
 Finally yet importantly, as any appeal against a cartel decision by the Commission aims at 
reaching a fine reduction or even a fine annulment, the final step in our quantitative analysis 
must investigate the questions, first, to what degree the appeals were generally successful and, 
second, how successful they turned out to be for the appealing firm groups. In absolute terms 
and referring to the entire observation period from 2001 to 2015, the general appeal success 
rates diverge substantially between the two stages. While in sum 119 of the 273 first-stage 
appeals were successful (about 44 percent), the respective numbers drop substantially for 
second-stage appeals with only 12 successful out of 84 second-stage appeals leading to a 
success rate of about 14 percent (see, e.g., Hüschelrath and Smuda (2016) for an econometric 
analysis). 
 Turning to the question of how successful appeals have been, Figure 30 below shows the 
average percentage reduction due to appeal in combination with the respective average fines 
per firm group before and after the appeals process. 
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Figure 30: Average percentage reduction due to appeal 
Source: own figure based on ZEW cartel database 
 
As shown in Figure 30, the average percentage reduction due to appeal experienced a rather 
moderate increase from about 7 percent in 2002 to 18 percent in 2008. After a substantial 
increase in the average percentage reduction up to 42 percent in 2010, an even more 
pronounced decrease was observed in the subsequent two years reaching the lowest value of 
about 1 percent in 2012. As already discussed above, this decrease is likely related to the 
introduction of the settlement procedure and the substantially reduced number of (promising) 
appeals in cartel cases.  
5 Summary and Conclusion 
“The competitor is our friend, and the customer is our enemy”39 once said a member of the 
global lysine price-fixing cartel that operated between 1992 and 1995. This statement 
probably qualifies as one of the best quotes describing the rationale of cartels – and the 
significant and long-lasting harm to customers and consumers they typically cause. However, 
the global lysine cartel can also act as prominent example of the severe consequences of 
cartelization for the involved firms after detection by a competition authority: the successive 
enforcement processes by the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the 
European Commission (EC) resulted in corporate fines of $91 million40 in the US and €109.9 
million41 in the EU – not to mention the additional individual fines (including 3 prison terms) 
in the US, further corporate fines imposed in other jurisdictions and various private damage 
claims. 
                                                     
39  The quote is taken from Connor (2008), p. 194. 
40  Connor (2008), p. 450. 
41  Commission Decision of 7 June 2000 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/36.545/F3 – Amino Acids), Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 152, 2001, 24-72, pp. 68f. 
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 In this context, we have provided a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and 
the related cartel enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a 
first step, we presented a detailed characterization of all cartel cases decided by the European 
Commission (EC) with respect to various criteria such as the number of involved firm groups, 
cartel market shares and market share asymmetries, involved industries, affected countries, 
types of infringement, types of cartel breakdown as well as cartel duration. In a second step, 
we complemented this cartel-based analysis with a quantitative assessment of the public cartel 
enforcement process in the European Union – subdivided further into its duration, types of 
cartel detection, the leniency program, the settlement procedure, overall fines imposed, and 
the conclusive appeals process with the General Court (GC) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). 
 Rather than trying to summarize the rich set of quantitative results and their interpretation, 
we close by characterizing the average cartel case and the average cartel enforcement process 
in the European Union for our observation period from 2001 to 2015. Starting with the 
average EU cartel, we can say that it consists of 7 firm groups stemming from 5 different 
countries, has a combined market share of 79 percent, operates in the manufacturing industry, 
uses direct price-fixing in combination with another type of infringement and lasts for 87 
months before it either dies of natural causes or is detected by the European Commission.  
 Turning from the average cartel case to the average enforcement process in the European 
Union, our quantitative assessment suggest that the case investigation by the Commission 
lasts 51 months, followed by a 51 months review by the General Court as first-stage appellate 
court. The final fine for a cartel is €231 million, compared to €36 million for a firm group. In 
the course of the investigation by the Commission, the maximum possible fine is reduced by 
45 percent – with the leniency program playing the most important role reaching a fine 
reduction of 29 percent (excluding the key witness). On appeal, a further reduction of 17 
percent of the final fine imposed by the Commission is reached.  
 Our quantitative assessment of detected cartels and the respective enforcement process in 
the European Union suggests several avenues of future research. In addition to econometric 
studies on specific issues touched above – such as ex-post evaluations of the 2006 revisions of 
the fine guidelines and the leniency notice – promising extensions in the range of topics 
would, on the one hand, be comparisons of our EU findings with other enforcement regimes 
such as the United States or single EU Member States. On the other hand, our focus on public 
enforcement in this paper would suggest a complementary quantitative assessment of private 
enforcement activities. However, although the European Commission recently published a 
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Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions42 – which is currently implemented by the Member 
States into their national legal systems – it appears unlikely that a sufficient amount of data 
for conducting quantitative studies will become available in the not too distant future.  
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